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COMMENTS
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP:
ARE YOU IN GOOD HANDS?
Sandra A. Tomst
It is as if our civilization has lost a sense of its future. We are
so busily engaged in making miracle products for our present en-
joyment from substances deposited in the earth over millions of
years, we don't stop to consider the environmental burdens we are
placing on future generations. We have pillaged the past and
pawned the future, telescoping time for the benefit of a fleeting
present. Only when the consequences begin to manifest themselves
in our own generation do we demand that changes be made.
It is now apparent, however, that industrial society has reached
a turning point. The future is no longer an endless, open and empty
frontier. Our children and grandchildren will likely face all the
problems they can handle even without the environmental ransom
we are currently demanding they pay. Our growing numbers and
our growing mastery of nature's subtle processes are forcing us to
forge a new ethic of "stewardship"-an ethic which insists that we
foresee and account for the future consequences of our present
actions.
*Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.'
INTRODUCrION
Since the Industrial Revolution, American big business has used
technology to become more efficient. One result is the use of toxic
substances-chlorine-based chemicals, such as chloroflurocarbons
(CFCs), hydrochloroflurocarbons (HCFCs) and chloramines-in the
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production of solvents, vinyl plastics, paper (bleaching process),
Styrofoam products, aerosol sprays, and refrigerants. Many of these
advances have been economically beneficial to big business and their
customers; American industry now has the ability to quickly produce
more products at a lower price.
However, for far too long the disposal of the byproducts and
toxic substances flowing from these breakthroughs has gone unregu-
lated, creating dangerous-possibly deadly-environmental hazards.
For instance, the delayed effects of toxic compounds play a significant
role in the development of chronic illnesses in humans-including
liver, gastro-intestinal tract, and central nervous system problems-
and cause irreversible damage-including genetic damage, birth de-
fects, and cancer.' The effects of many toxic substances commonly
used and recklessly disposed of today may be unknown for many
years.
Environmental liability exposure has increased in the past
twenty-five years primarily as a result of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),3 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),4 state and federal
administrative "cleanup" orders, private party environmental tort/
cleanup suits, and public interest.' Public awareness over the envi-
ronment grew throughout the 1960s, culminating in the first Earth Day
in 1970.6
The cost of environmental liability is staggering. Estimated envi-
ronmental cleanup costs vary. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) originally estimated the cost of cleaning up a waste site appear-
ing on the National Priorities List at $8 million.7 By 1986, that esti-
mate soared to between $30 million and $50 million. Others estimate
the average cost for a typical site to be around $12 million9 to $25
million and the average time to complete a clean up to be 7 to 10
2. EpsTmn, supra note 1, at 36.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982).
5. Nancer Ballard et al., Insurance Coverage for Environmental Losses and Liabilities, in
4 Tim LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LLADUrrY, AND LmriAMON
§ 19.0112] at 19-11 to -12 (Christopher P. Davis ed., 1992).
6. EPsTmN,'supra note 1, at 182.
7. Extent of the Hazardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs, CERCLA
§ 301(a)(1)(C) study, F'mal Report (Dec. 1984). cited in Peter J. Kalis & Thomas M. Reiter,
Forum Non Conveniens: A Case Management Tool for Comprehensive Environmental Insurance
Coverage Actions?, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 391, 397-98 n.22 (1990).
8. Id.
9. James W. Spertus, Holding Environmental Consultants Liable for Their Negligence: A
Proposalfor Change, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1147 (1991).
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years.10 In order to survive, businesses must pursue all available
means of minimizing or eliminating their potential liability. Effective
risk management programs include comprehensive (or commercial)
general liability (CGL) insurance to protect businesses against envi-
ronmental claims."
Hundreds of courts across the country are now determining the
extent of environmental liability protection provided by CGL policies.
However, in many states, basic coverage issues remain unresolved or
are subject to conflicting case law. 2 Adding to the confusion is the
fact that state law is used to interpret the terms of insurance contracts
and different states have put different interpretations on identical pol-
icy language.13 Nonetheless, CGL insurance remains a critical com-
ponent of nearly all business risk management programs since liability
for environmental cleanup can be imposed not only on those that
cause the environmental hazard, but on former or current owners of
the contaminated property as well.' 4 Few companies can afford to be
ignorant of the basic principles and obligations of their insurance poli-
cies and the potential environmental coverage they provide.,
This paper explores some of the insurance coverage issues in-
volved in environmental cleanup for businesses. Part I presents key
provisions of the standard CGL policy and how they have evolved.
Part II examines the issues of what property damage is covered and
when coverage begins or triggers in environmental claims cases. Fi-
nally, Part HI identifies other potential avenues of coverage and some
limitations of coverage.
PART I: EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL
LLAmrrY (CGL) POLIcY
A. General Insurance Principles
An insurance contract is to an ordinary contract what humans are
to whales: same class, different species. Courts do not employ the
same rules of construction for the interpretation of each. Most ordi-
nary contracts are presumed to be freely negotiated between the par-
ties. However, most insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion: an
10. Ted Williams, The Sabotage of Superfund, AUDUBoN, July-Aug. 1993, at 30, 31.
11. The cost of protection is not cheap. Two million dollars worth of coverage costs $3-4
thousand annually. Bruce G. Posner, Removing the Cleanup Risk, INc., May 1993, at 36.
12. Ballard, supra note 5, at 19-13.
13. ALu'm R. Lionrr, CERCLA LAw AND PRocEDURE 8 (1991).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
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insurance company drafts the terms of the policy 15 and offers it to the
insured on a "take it or leave it" basis.16 The weaker party has no
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract and must adhere to
the contract or forgo the needed insurance.
1 7
One of the most important rules of construction used by courts in
interpreting insurance policies is that any doubt or ambiguity as to the
meaning of a provision must be resolved in favor of the insured and in
favor of coverage."8 Furthermore, courts will protect the reasonable
expectations of an insured when identifying ambiguities and interpret
policies as an ordinary policy holder would interpret it.' 9
This rule is applied with particular force to exclusions.2" Exclu-
sionary clauses have been interpreted to maximize any coverage an
insured may have. They are interpreted narrowly against the insurer.2
If an insurer wishes to narrow or limit coverage, they must do so using
clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable language.22
Along with the duty to indemnify the insured in case of loss,
virtually all CGL policies include provisions for the insurer to arrange
15. Insurers usually use standardized forms that are employed for all similar transactions.
The major benefits of standardization are cost and time savings. With the use of standardized
forms, the insurer is not required to customize a policy for every insured, thus making insurance
more affordable and minimizing time spent on drafting policies. RoBERT E. KEaTON & ALAN I.
Wmiss, INsuRANcE LAw, A GImE TO FUNDAmENTAL PRmICnpLms, LEaAL DocnuNrs, AND COM-
mERCaIL PRAcriczs 119 (student ed. 1988).
Some sophisticated insureds negotiate and jointly draft their policies with their insurer.
When this occurs, the courts do not construe the terms of the policy against the insurer. See
discussion in part III.B., infra.
16. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson et al., 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del.
1974), citing Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 873 (NJ. 1968) ("Mhe
terms of an insurance policy are not talked out or bargained for as in the case of contracts
generally...').
17. See, e.g., Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 519 F. Supp. 668
(D. Del. 1981).
18. See, e.g., Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163 (1977); Tenney v. Ins.
Co. of North Am., 409 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Myrtil v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 510 F.
Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406,412 (NJ. 1985) ('The recognition
that insurance policies are not readily understood has impelled courts to resolve ambiguities in
such contracts against the insurance companies .... [and] has also led courts to enforce unam-
biguous insurance contracts in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.").
20. See, e.g., Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 740 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.
1984) (exclusions are construed most strongly against the insurance company and in favor of the
insured).
21. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
22. See, e.g., National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp.
1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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for or pay the expenses of certain suits brought against the insured.23
While the insurer's duty to indemnify is limited by the amount of cov-
erage the insured purchases, the aggregate limit of the policy is not
reduced by the amount spent on defending a suit.' Furthermore, an
insured's duty to defend can continue indefinitely without limit. 5
B. Historical Background of Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) Policies and Standardization
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies have
traditionally been preferred by businesses because they provide, and
were intended to provide, the broadest coverage available. CGL in-
surance is designed to protect the insured against liabilities to third
parties. The coverage is broad, extending to any business liability
which is not expressly excluded.26
1. Early Liability Policies
Standard CGL policies first appeared in the United States in the
1880s and have since been periodically revised. 7 The first policies
were "monoline," meaning businesses would purchase a separate lia-
bility policy for each type of risk insured against. 8 This "separate
policy" approach was later abandoned in favor of the "scheduled lia-
bility" approach. The scheduled approach allowed businesses to
purchase different coverages all in one policy; the coverages selected
by the insured were stated on the policy's "declarations" page.29 A
scheduled insurance package was often extremely complex and con-
fusing to insureds because each type of coverage was governed under
separate terms and conditions.30 These shortcomings emphasized the
need for less complex agreements.
23. David W. Steuber, Overview of Environmental Claims and Insurance Coverage Litiga-
tion, reprinted in INsuRANca C Is FoR ENvmo msmrA. DAMAGES 7 (Lynne M. Miller ed.,
1989).
24. L
25. I
26. See, e.g., Gray v. State, Through Dept. of Highway, 191 So. 2d 802, 816 (La. Ct. App.
1966), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 24 (1967).
27. Ballard, supra note 5, at 19-19.
28. Id.
29. The declarations page typically identifies the persons or entities who are the insureds,
insurance coverage purchased, and the coverage amounts. KEaroN & Wmniss, supra note 15, at
287. Thus, it is an extremely important page in determining whether coverage even exists for an
environmental claims case.
30. Ballard, supra note 5, at 19-20.
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In 1941, the standard CGL policy was revised to eliminate the
confusion caused by scheduled policies.31 The new policy was
designed to provide coverage for "all business liability exposures
known to exist at the inception of the policy and all unforeseen
hazards which could arise during the policy period. '32 This policy
became popular among businesses that had trouble identifying all po-
tential risks at the beginning of the policy period and those that could
arise after.
Since 1941, CGL policies have continued to evolve. The most
significant events in its evolution include the development of accident
and occurrence policies and the pollution exclusion.
2. Accident Policies
Between 1940 and 1966, CGL policies provided coverage for lia-
bility for bodily injury or property damage "caused by accident. '33
These were typically called "accident" policies and generally provided
coverage for claims resulting from gradual deterioration and long-term
exposure to injurious conditions or substances.34
Lancaster Area Refuse Authority v. Transamerica Insurance
Company35 involved such a policy. Transamerica issued a policy to
the Lancaster Area Refuse Authority (the Authority), a landfill opera-
tor, in which they agreed to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury or destruction to property, including loss of use
31. The basic provisions of the CGL policy form were drafted as a combined effort of the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU), later known as the Insurance Rating Board
(IRB) in the late 1960s, and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB), the insurance indus-
try's two trade organizations. These organizations merged in the early 1970s to form the Insur-
ance Services Office (ISO) which continues to draft and revise standard policies today. Id. at 19-
20 n.15.
32. L at 19-20.
33. Steuber, supra note 23, at 5.
34. See, e.g., Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hospital of Pierre v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987) (damage from long-term build up of soot was an "acci-
dent' because it was, unexpected or unintended within the meaning of the policy); White v.
Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) ("accident" within the meaning of the policy can be
a process); Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136,
1148 (D.N.J. 1993) ("[B]ecause the common understanding of the term 'accident' does not nec-
essarily exclude long-term happenings .... the term [is] ambiguous .... and coverage for long-
term soil and water contamination is allowed.); McGroarty v. Great American Ins. Co., 329
N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1975) (property damage occurring over several months still considered an
accident). But see, Jeffreyes v. Charles H. Sager Co., 198 A.D. 446 (1921), aff'd, 135 N.E. 907
(N.Y. 1922); Berger Bros. Elec. Motors, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 26
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 58 N.E.2d 717 (1944).
35. 263 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1970).
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thereof, caused by accident." 36 Refuse dumped by the Authority in a
landfill operation near the city of Lancaster polluted the water wells of
two neighboring properties.37 The court held that harm caused to
property owners by the negligence of the Authority were damages
"caused by accident" within the meaning of the policy. 38
The term "accident" was not defined by the standard form acci-
dent policy. It later became defined as a "sudden," "fortuitous," or
"unexpected" event. 9
3. "Occurrence" Policies
In 1966, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), a successor organi-
zation to the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, promulgated
a standard form policy that was substantially similar to accident poli-
cies.40 However, the new policy provided coverage for injuries
caused by an "occurrence" rather than by "accident."'" These policies
typically defined "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious ex-
posure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured."'42
In changing from "accident" to "occurrence" policies, the insur-
ance industry intended to increase coverage.43 In fact, the increase in
36. 1d. at 369.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Geddes & Smith Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881 (Cal.
1959) (malfunction which took place over the period of a few days to six months, constituted
"sudden" accidents); Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 295 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1956)
(water damage which occurred gradually over time found to be an "unexpected" accident); Hyer
v. Inter- Ins. Exchange of Automobile Club, 246 P. 1055 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926); Taylor v. Impe-
rial Casualty & Indem. Co., 144 N.W.2d 856 (S.D. 1966) (seepage of gasoline from an under-
ground storage tank was an "undesigned, sudden and unexpected event" or accident); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 990 F.2d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 1993) ("accident" refers
to unexpected or unintended events).
40. See, supra note 31.
41. Eugene R. Anderson & Thomas H. Sear, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Lia-
bility: Technical and Legal Considerations; Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims: Insurance
Coverage in 1989 and Beyond 35,43 (Practicing Law Institute, Commercial Law & Prac. Course
Handbook Series, No. 495, 1989), cited in Ballard, supra note 5, at 19-23.
42. Id. See, e.g., Patroms-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981).
43. G.L. Bean of Mutual Liberty Insurance Company, who played a key role in drafting
the CGL policy, explained at an insurance industry conference that "Smoke, fumes, or other air
or stream pollution have caused an endless chain of severe claims for gradual property dam-
age.... [Manufacturers] need... protection [from these claims] and should legitimately expect
to be able to buy it, so we have provided it [under the new CGL policy]." G.L. Bean, Assistant
Secretary, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The
Effect on Manufacturing Rlsks, paper presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference, Nov.
15-18, 1965, at 6, 10, quoted in Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage; the
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coverage was accompanied by an increase in CGL insurance premi-
ums.' This move was made "in response to consumer demands for
broader liability protection and in acquiescence to the judicial trend
toward a more expansive reading of the term accident."4
An occurrence policy is designed to prohibit coverage where an
insured knew or should have known of ongoing pollution." In Sum-
mit Associates, Incorporated v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany,47 Summit, a real estate developer, bought property from the
Edison Township which had been used as a sewage treatment facility
twenty years earlier.48 Edison bought the property from the United
States government who had used it as an arsenal and to burn muni-
tions.49 Summit was not informed of any of these past uses of the
property.50 While preparing the land for construction, Summit discov-
ered a large underground sludge pit which began leaking "odiferous"
liquid.51 Summit was ordered to clean up the property. 2
Summit was insured by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
(Liberty).53 Liberty agreed to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance
applies caused by an occurrence." 54  Occurrence was defined as an
"accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured."'5
The court found that Liberty incorrectly refused to indemnify
Summit for the cost of cleanup because Liberty failed to establish that
"Summit knew or should have known of the likelihood that construc-
tion on its premises would result in the release of contaminants."56
Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective
Amnesia, 21 ENvn. L. 357, 365-66 (1991).
44. See Werner Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 Am. B.
FouND. RES. J. 347, 438 (change to "occurrence" was "perceived and intended to be a broaden-
ing of the coverage compensated by a premium surcharge .... )
45. Broadwell Realty Services Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 84 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) [citations omitted].
46. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437
(D. Kan. 1990); Alcolac, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 716 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Md. 1989).
47. 550 A.2d 1235 (NJ. 1988).
48. Id. at 1237.
49. Id.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Summit Associates, 550 A.2d at 1237.
53. Id at 1238.
54. Id
55. id. (emphasis added).
56. Id at 1239 (emphasis added).
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4. Pollution Exclusions
i. The 1973 Pollution Exclusion
The CGL policy was again revised in 1973 to include a new pol-
lution endorsement, commonly refered to as exclusion "f". As modi-
fied, the policy excluded coverage for
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alka-
lis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmos-
phere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.57
Litigation regarding the pollution exclusion in environmental
claims has pivoted on the meaning of "sudden and accidental." Insur-
ers argue "sudden" bears only a temporal meaning (i.e., abrupt).58 For
example, the California Court of Appeal in Shell Oil Company v. Win-
terthur Swiss Insurance Company 9 recently took a stand in this hotly
contested issue. In Shell Oil, the insured, Shell, leased part of an old
Army arsenal that had been used to produce chemical munitions.60
Shell used it to produce agricultural chemicals.6 Shell's production
generated toxic wastes which were disposed of on-site. 2 The waste
eventually contaminated the groundwater, and Shell became liable for
cleanup.6 3 Shell filed suit against multiple insurance carriers who pro-
vided coverage during the period they leased the property (from 1940
57. Insurance Services Office ("ISO") Form GL 00 02 (Ed. 01 73), reprinted in DONALD S.
MALWca & ARnmu L. Fummt, CoMnmacmi. GENRAL LA~nxr app. 148 (3d ed. 1990).
58. See, e.g., ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 22 Cal.
2d 206 (Cal. App.1993); Barmet of Indiana v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. App.
1981); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus. Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990);
Matakas v. Citizens Mut. Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. App. 1993); FL Aerospace v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990) (Michigan law), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284
(1990); Krawczewski v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Waste Management v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688 (Mich. 1986); Great Lakes Container
Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir. 1984) (New Hampshire law); Ogden
Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991) (New York law); Hybud Equip. Corp.
v. Sphere Drake Ins., 597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992); Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark
Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991) (Pennsylvania law); Grenville County v. Insurance
Res. Fund, 427 S.E.2d 913 (S.C. App. 1993); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) (Utah law), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
59. 12 Cal. App. 4th 715 (1993).
60. Id. at 732
61. Id
62. Id. at 732-33.
63. Id. at 734.
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to 1983; approximately 800 insurance policies were involved).64 The
jury found for the insurers and Shell appealed.65
-On appeal, Shell argued, among other things, that "sudden" was
given an improper temporal meaning which limited Shell's cover-
age.6 6 Shell contended that "sudden" can mean "unexpected" or "un-
intended" and further that the term "sudden," as used in the policy, is
ambiguous. In analyzing Shell's contentions, the court used two basic
rules of construction: (1) the policy language was given its plain and
ordinary meaning, and (2) the insurance contract was interpreted so as
to give effect to every part, that is, defining words in such a way so as
not'to produce redundancy and to give each word significance. 67
Therefore, as in Shell's policies, where the pollution exclusion covers
pollution which results from "a sudden, unintended and unexpected
happening" or where "a discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sud-
den and accidental" each word must be given a distinct meaning. 68
The court was not persuaded by the fact that not all dictionary mean-
ings of "sudden" include temporal terms, rather the court gathered the
meaning of "sudden" from the context in. which it was used.69 The
court stated that one aspect of the meaning of "sudden" included "un-
expected." But the court felt that to say "sudden" means "unex-
pected" would strip "sudden" of an important temporal facet of its
ordinary meaning and the meaning in the context in which it was
used.7" Likewise, giving "sudden" a temporal meaning avoids redun-
dancy in the phrase "sudden and accidental."71 "Accident" conveys
an unexpected and unintended meaning while sudden conveys a tem-
poral one." Therefore, the court held that if "sudden" was to be given
any meaning in the pollution exclusion, only an abrupt discharge or
release of pollutants would suffice.73 However, the court did state that
"sudden" only "refers to the pollution's commencement and does not
require that the polluting event terminate quickly or have only a brief
duration."'74 Thus, coverage could be found under the pollution exclu-
sion for a sudden and accidental discharge of pollutants which contin-
64. Shell Oil, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 735-36.
65. Id.'at 736.
66. ad at 751.
67. 1d. at 753.
68. Id.
69. Shell Oil, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 754.
70. Id. at 754.
71. Id. at 755
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Shell Oi 12 Cal. App. 4th at 756. [citations omitted].
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ued unabated for a time because of the insured's failure to discover it
or lack of resources to stop it.
75
However, the court failed to explain in .its analysis the apparent
redundancy of terms used in other portions of the pollution exclusion
(and more generally in the contract of insurance itself) and construed
the terms used in the exclusion against the insured. As stated above,
the pollution exclusion does not apply to the "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contami-
nants or pollutants" which are not sudden and accidental. 76 This
clause in the insurance contract seems to use terms which were inten-
tionally made to be redundant to -cover every imaginable method of
contaminant dispersal. In a later decision,77 the court explained that
the meanings of sudden and accidental overlap. It further stated that
the fatal flaw in decisions which give "sudden" an "unexpected or
unintended" meaning is that it "renders 'sudden' a mere subset of 'ac-
cidental,' making it totally redundant." '78
Policy-holders, on the other hand, argue the term "sudden" is am-
biguous because it also connotes an unexpected or unintended release
of pollutants.7 9 Since sudden is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the insured and in favor of coverage. Thus, grad-
ual events can be covered provided the pollution damage was neither
expected nor intended by the insured.8 0 - This argument was success-
fully applied in CPC International Incorporated v. Northbrook Excess
& Surplus Insurance Company.8 In 1968, the insured, CPC, a food
and chemical manufacturer, acquired a manufacturing facility which
75. Id.
76. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77. ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th
1773, 1787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala.
1985); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991); New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991) (Delaware law);
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1989); Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (I1. 1992); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.
Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. App. 1988); Du-Wel Products Inc. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co. , 565 A.2d 1113 (NJ. App. Div. 1989); Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987) (South Dakota law); Queen City Farms
Inc. v. Central Nat'I Ins., 827 P.2d 1024 (Wash. App. Div. 1992); Joy Technologies Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 421 S.E. 2d 493 (W. Va. 1992); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456
N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990), reconsid. denied, 461 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. 1990).
80. Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solv. & Chem., 477 N.E. 2d 1227, 1235 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984)
81. 962 F.2d 77 (lst Cir. 1992) (New Jersey law).
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produced flea spray, hair spray, spot remover and oven cleaner.82 In
1982, a town neighboring the manufacturing facility sued CPC for
contamination of its well water caused by activities at the plant.8 3
While the exact cause of the contamination was unknown, 4 the evi-
dence suggested that the release of hazardous material into the ground
was caused by "several distinct events-occurring at different times-
and from different sources at the plant."8 5 In determining if the re-
lease was "sudden and accidental" and thus covered under the policy,
the court looked at the evolution of the phrase "sudden and accidental"
in the insurance industry 6 and the judicial interpretations given to the
phrase by various jurisdictions.8 7
Upon examining the phrase "sudden and accidental" in context of
its use in the insurance industry, the court found that
[flor many years, [the phrase] had been used in the standard boiler
and machinery policy, and the courts uniformly had construed the
phrase to mean unexpected and unintended .... We think that it is
reasonable to assume that the insurance industry was aware of the
construction when it chose to use the phrase "sudden and acciden-
tal" in the pollution exclusion clause.88
Furthermore, the court was persuaded by the overwhelming judi-
cial disagreement regarding the interpretation of the phrase. It ex-
plained: "[t]hat so many learned jurists throughout the nation differ on
the construction of this phrase is, in our view, additional proof that the
phrase admits of two reasonable constructions [one with and one with-
out a temporal construction]."89 Thus, the court found that the phrase
was ambiguous.
Courts finding the phrase "sudden and accidental" ambiguous
have emphasized the fact that dictionary definitions of "sudden" do
not necessarily convey a temporal element. 0 The fact that "sudden"
is susceptible to two or more possible meanings (one "unexpected"
and one temporal) makes it by definition ambiguous. 91 Therefore,
courts following this approach resolve such ambiguity against the
insurer.
82. Id. at 79.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 82.
85. Id.
86. CPC International, 962 F.2d at 94.
87. Id. at 95.
88. Id. at 94-95.
89. Id. at 95.
90. See, e.g., New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1193.
91. WEansTR's New UmvERsAL UNABRmDGED DicnoNARY, 2d Vol. (1979) defines ambig-
uous as "having two or more possible meanings."
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Insureds have also attempted to introduce the drafting history of
the pollution exclusion to aid the courts in the interpretation of "sud-
den and accidental." 92 Specifically, the drafting history indicates that
when the exclusion was introduced, the insurance executives intro-
duced and marketed it "as a clarification, rather than a restriction of
coverage."9
3
Courts rejecting insureds attempts to bring in drafting history
have done so for at least two reasons. First, extrinsic evidence is only
admissible to shed light on an ambiguity, thus an ambiguity must be
shown first.9 4 Under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence may
not be used to contradict the ordinary meaning of words in a con-
tract.95 Since "sudden and accidental" is interpreted by many courts
as unambiguous,96 evidence of drafting history to explain the terms of
the policy are barred. And secondly, evidence of drafting history is
not allowed into evidence because it contradicts the notion that insur-
ance policies are to be interpreted the way an ordinary lay-person
would interpret them.97 Courts allowing drafting history and other in-
surance industry documents into evidence to explain "sudden and ac-
cidental" have ruled in favor of the insured.9
ii. The 1986 Absolute Pollution Exclusion
In 1986 the pollution exclusion was rewritten so that sudden and
accidental releases would no longer be covered; nearly all coverage
for pollution was excluded. This version of exclusion "f," commonly
referred to as "the absolute pollution exclusion," excluded coverage
for:
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the actual,
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
92. See ACL Technologies, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1790; New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1197.
93. New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1197-98
94. ACL Technologies, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1790-91.
95. Idl at 1791.
96. See supra note 58.
97. ACL Technologies, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1791.
98. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Delaware law), reversed on other grounds, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as
modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984) (New York law); American Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 854
P.2d 622 (Wash. 1993).
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(b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or others
for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment
.,of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated,
disposed of, or processed as waste by or for you or any
person or organization for whom you may be legally re-
sponsible; or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or any con-
tractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on
your behalf are performing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location
in connection with such operations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, re-
move, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the
pollutants.
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any governmental di-
rection or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, re-
conditioned or reclaimed. 99
The superior court of Delaware applied the absolute pollution ex-
clusion and barred insurance coverage for an environmental hazard
case. In Sequa Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Com-
pany,"°° the insured, Sequa, sought coverage from fifty insurers for
various environmental actions brought against it at nine sites in eight
states.101 The CERCLA actions brought against Sequa alleged dam-
ages to groundwater and soil from hazardous substances which were
used, stored, handled, generated and/or disposed of on the Sequa
sites.102 Sequa's complaint sought coverage for personal injury and/or
property damage arising out of the pollution at the sites.103 National
Casualty Company, one of the insurers, moved for summary judg-
ment, contending that the absolute pollution exclusion contained in the
policy precluded coverage at six sites."w The court, applying New
99. ISO Form CG 00 01 (Ed. 11 85), reprinted in MALracKi & FUrNE., supra note 57, at
156.
100. No. 89C-AP-1 (Del. Super. July 16, 1992).
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id at 10.
103. Id. at 11.
104. The absolute pollution exclusion was similar to that in supra note 99 and accompany-
ing text. Sequa, No. 89C-AP-1 at 14.
386 [Vfol. 10
1994] INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP 387
York law, held that the policy language barred the coverage sought by
Sequa.10
5
a Thus, the 1986 pollution exclusion eliminates CGL coverage for
all but a very few types 'of environmental harms occurring after 1986.
PART II: PROPERTY DAMAGE AND COVERAGE TRiGGERS IN
ENvIRONMENTAL CLAIMS CASES
A. CERCLA Liability Extends to Many Parties
Concern over environmental damage to property grew as society
realized burying drums of pollutants in abandoned landfills was no
longer a safe or effective means of waste disposal. The question then
became: who was responsible for cleanup?
As simplistic as that question may seem, it presented many
unique legal problems. The polluted site could have had multiple
owner-operators each generating and disposing of their own waste.
Furthermore, most hazardous waste is dumped over the course of sev-
eral of years. Many years can pass before leakage occurs and the con-
tamination causes injury to the surrounding soil, groundwater and
public. These factors created problems in the allocation of blame and
liability for polluters.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) was enacted by Congress to
confront problems posed by hazardous waste sites.'06 CERCLA pro-
visions enacted to address these issues include establishing a fund to
help pay for cleanup ("Superfund"), requiring the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to work with local and state officials to identify
and clean up waste sites, and empowering the EPA to pursue the re-
sponsible parties and have them pay for cleanup.' 0 7
CERCLA does not preempt state law regarding the interpretation
of insurance contracts, except to the extent clearly stated in CERCLA
provisions (such as those regarding purchasing and risk retention
group formation).108
105. 1l
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq.
107. Steuber, supra note 23, at 15.
108. See, e.g., Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double D Management Co., 768 F. Supp. 1538 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
CERCLA was hastily drafted and quickly enacted and thus is replete with ambiguity.
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985). One such example is section
9607(e)(1) which provides:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be
effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from
any person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this section,
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CERCLA imposes strict,1" retroactive,110 and joint and sev-
eral'11 liability. Former and current owners of property can be held
liable under CERCLA.' 2 Thus, escaping liability can be difficult and
defendants in a CERCLA action can number in the hundreds.
B. Coverage for Cleanup Costs in Comprehensive General
Liability (CGL) Policies
A business' Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy pro-
vides coverage for all sums the business shall become liable to pay as
damages for bodily injury and property damage which is caused by an
occurrence not excluded by the terms of the policy. In recent years,
insurers have argued that this indemnity agreement does not include
environmental cleanup costs.
Whether or not CGL policies provide coverage for cleanup costs
is presently a hotly contested issue. A study by the RAND Institute
for Civil Justice found that 42 percent of the money spent on pollution
claims by insurers went towards litigating coverage disputes with their
insureds."1 3 In these disputes with their insureds, insurers have used
the following arguments with varying success: (1) environmental re-
sponse costs are restitutional in nature, and as such are not compensa-
tory damages covered under the CGL policy; (2) cleanup orders are
the insured's injunctive obligation and not a liability to pay damages;
and (3) environmental response costs exceed the value of the contami-
nated property and should therefore not be paid.
to any other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this sub-
section shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to
such agreement for any liability under this section.
The first sentence of this section appears to contradict the second. This has been reconciled
in the following manner "[A] liable party remains liable (e.g., to the United States) regardless of
whether it has an indemnity agreement, but the liable party still may proceed against a third party
(e.g., an insurance company) which has agreed to indemnify the liable party." Central Illinois
Public Serv. Co. v.+ Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Services, 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1507
(W.D. Mo. 1990).
109. See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. Adm'r., Envtl. Protection Agency, 767 F.2d 263 (6th
Cir. 1985); State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2). See, e.g., Price v. United States Navy, 818 F. Supp. 1326
(S.D. Cal. 1992); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York Housing Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1271
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 608 A.2d 1082 (Pa. 1992) (owner
need not actively participate in generating or disposing of hazardous substances to be liable
under CERCLA).
113. Norma Formanek, A Policy for Payment, Time RzconnDE, ENvm L. Supei mwEr,
Sept. 1992, at 23.
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1. Environmental Response Costs as "Damages" Under
the Standard CGL Policy
Several courts have held that environmental response costs are
"damages" within the meaning of the CGL policy. 114 These courts
base their decisions on the ordinary, commonly understood meaning
of the term "damages," and the reasonable expectations of the insur-
ance purchaser procuring CGL coverage. The court in Outboard
Marine Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,' fol-
lowed this approach.
Outboard Marine Corporation (OMC) is a large manufacturer of
outboard motors." 6 0M C has operated a die-casting facility in
Waukegan, Illinois since the 1940s." 7 From 1959 to 1972, OMC
used a hydraulic fluid containing polycholnated biphenyls (PCBs) in
its die-casting process.118 During the die-casting process, some of the
PCB-laden material leaked and spilled into its wastewater system,
which later found its way into Waukegan Harbor and Lake Michi-
gan." 9 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed an action
against OMC seeking an injunction and requiring OMC to clean up
the contamination.
OMC was insured by Liberty Mutual. Under the terms of the
policy, Liberty Mutual agreed to "pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay as damages
because of... property damage .... caused by an occurrence, and the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suits against the
insured seeking damages on account of such property damage .... ,120
Liberty Mutual asserted that it was not required to defend OMC in the
114. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990); A.Y. McDonald
Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1991); Hazen Paper Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990); C. D. Spangler Constr. Co. v.
Industrial Crankshaft & Engineering Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444
N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1989), rev'd, 476 N.W.2d 392; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (I1. 1989); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989) (New York law), reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Inc. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d
1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (Idaho law); Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double D Management Co., 768 F. Supp.
1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (Florida law) (held environmental clean up costs were "damages" under
policy but coverage was barred by pollution exclusion); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Inc. v.
PintaIr Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (Washington law).
115. 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992).
116. Id. at 1213.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1213.
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actions brought by the EPA.121 Liberty Mutual argued that the term
"damages" has a technical meaning and the phrase "suits seeking
damages" as used in the policy provided coverage only for compensa-
tory, legal damages. - . Further, Liberty Mutual contended that this
phrase was unambiguous and did not include coverage for suits seek-
ing equitable or injunctive relief. 123
The courts decision turned on the definition of the word "dam-
ages" as used in the policy. Since the term was not defined by the
policy, the court interpreted this term "by affording it its plain, ordi-
nary, and popular meaning."124 The court found that the definition of
the term "damages" "does not distinguish between legal compensatory
damages or the costs of complying with a mandatory injunction. It
merely indicates that "damages" stands for the money required to be
expended in order to right a wrong."" 5 The court further reasoned,
[I]t is of little consequence whether the remedy is in the form of
legal or equitable relief is especially true in the context of the broad
protective purposes of a CGL insurance policy. Such a policy
would be of little utility in protecting its purchaser if its coverage
rises or falls upon the whim of the underlying plaintiff and whether
the underlying complaint prayed for legal or equitable relief.126
A few courts, however, have held that cleanup costs are not dam-
ages under the standard CGL policy. 27 These courts rest their deci-
sions on arguments similar to those asserted by Liberty Mutual in the
above case: that cleanup costs are equitable in nature and, thus, are
excluded from liability because they are not covered "at law dam-
ages," discussed below.
2. Cleanup Orders: the Insured's Injunctive Obligation
Insurers argue that claims for cleanup orders are equitable reme-
dies and that the term "damages," as used in the CGL policy, does not
cover restitutionary claims under CERCLA because injunctive-relief
121. Id at 1214.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1214-1215.
124. Id. at 1215.
125. Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1216.
126. Id
127. See, e.g., Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (Flor-
ida law); Verlan Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. I11. 1988) (Illinois law);
A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1990) (Maine law),
aff'd, 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. 718 F. Supp. 1252
(D. Md. 1989) (Maryland law).
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claims are equitable in nature. 2 ' On the other hand, policy-holders
insist that the term is broad enough to include cleanup costs.
129
The court in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. General Dy-
namics Corporation1 30 held that the term "damages" in General Dy-
namics' CGL policy did not cover cleanup costs. 131  General
Dynamics was involved in lawsuits for environmental contamination
at seven sites and received letters from federal and state agencies, as
well as private parties, demanding clean up at nine other sites.
132
General Dynamics had a CGL policy with Aetna, but Aetna refused to
defend General Dynamics in the actions because the actions sought
reimbursement, restitution or payment of cleanup costs. 133 The court
agreed with Aetna stating,
Because these causes of action are "essentially equitable actions for
monetary relief in the form of restitution or reimbursement of
costs," [citations omitted], CGL coverage is precluded. To hold
otherwise would undermine the rationale adopted in [Continental
Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.134 - ],
which distinguished between legal and equitable damages. .'.. The
CGL does, however, cover any legal claims asserted against Gen-
eral Dynamics.
135
128. See, e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (Maine
law); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986), affd, 822 F.2d
1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (Maryland law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Continental Ins. Cos.
v. Northeastern Pharmaceulical and Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (Missouri law),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Lido Co. of New England, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
574 A.2d 299 (Me. 1990) (New Hampshire law).
129. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Delaware law); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991) (California
law); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (Idaho law);
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Missouri law); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989)
(New York law), reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990); Federal Ins.
Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.) (Pennsylvania law), cert. 'denied
112 S. Ct. 86 (1991); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576
(Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 172 (Minn.
1990); C. D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., Inc., 388 S.E.2d 557
(N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
130. 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.) (Missouri law), reh'g, en banc, denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
20679 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 1992).
131. Id. at 712-13.
132. Id. at 709.
133. Id. at 712
134. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, Missouri v. Continental Ins. Cos., 488
U.S. 821 (1988).
135. Aetna Casualty, 968 F.2d at 712.
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3. Environmental Costs Exceeding the Value of the
Property
Insurers have argued that the cost of restoring contaminated prop-
erty does not constitute damages since the cost or restoration can ex-
ceed the value of the land. Most courts have summarily rejected this
argument, reasoning that the cost of restoring natural resources is the
appropriate measure of damages.1 36
C. Trigger of Coverage for Environmental Claims Cases
For the purposes of indemnification for cleanup costs under a
CGL policy, an event must occur to trigger coverage-that is, there
must be some property damage caused by an occurrence during the
policy period from the insurance company or companies in which the
insured seeks coverage. 13 Environmental claims often involve events
which have gone unnoticed for many years (i.e., ground water contam-
ination from a landfill of leaking hazardous waste barrels), making the
exact date or dates when the injury took place nearly impossible to
pinpoint.
In response to the latent property damage claims, courts have de-
veloped four major theories regarding the issue of when an event "oc-
curs" for purposes of insurance coverage: (1) the exposure theory; (2)
continuous trigger theory; (3) injury-in-fact theory; and (4) the mani-
festation or first discovery approach.
1. The Exposure Theory
Under the exposure approach, property damage occurs and cover-
age is triggered when the property is first exposed to the hazardous or
harmful substance. 138  For example, in Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation,139 where the policies covered oc-
currences within the policy period, the court held that "each exposure
of the environment to a pollutant constitutes an occurrence and trig-
gers coverage.' 140
136. See, e.g., United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. 1983);
Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 738 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
137. It may be helpful to think of this as the date of occurrence.
138. See, e.g., Continential Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., Inc.
811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1989).
139. 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987), motion for immediate appeal denied, 682 F. Supp.
71 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
140. IL at 76.
[Vol. 10
1994] INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP 393
2. The Continuous Trigger Theory
Under the continuous trigger approach, 141 all insurance policies
in effect from the time of first exposure of hazardous substances to the
time the insured is notified of the damage are liable.'4 2 "The 'continu-
ous trigger' concept of insurance coverage recognizes that it is proba-
bly impossible to ascribe damage to any particular policy year in the
damage proliferation process, and thus, the entirety of insurance cov-
erage existent during the years of proliferation, should be available for
indemnification."" g3
For example, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Triangle
Industries, Incorporated,'" the insured, Triangle, operated a pickling
plant which generated a waste product known as "lime stabilized
waste pickle liquor sludge."' 45 The sludge was shipped to a landfill
for disposal during November 1977 and October 1980.146 The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a test of the landfill in
October 1980 and discovered that the sludge was toxic and leaking
from the landfill. 47 In December 1984, the EPA notified Triangle
that it was a potentially responsible party pursuant to CERCLA in
connection with the contamination at the landfill. 148 During this pe-
riod, Triangle had CGL coverage from three different insurance com-
panies. 149 The coverage period of each was as follows: Company
"A", January 1981 to January 1982; Company "B", January 1982 to
January 1984; and Company "C", January 1984 to January 1986. The
court, applying New Jersey law, found the continuous trigger theory
141. There is some evidence which suggests that the insurance industry itself intended a
continuous trigger approach. An advertisement from CNA boasted:
Imagine being surprised in 15 years with a liability lawsuit.
You just never know if a service performed today, a product sold tomorrow,
or a material used next week may come back to haunt you in the form of a law-
suit. Even if it takes 5, 10, or 30 years to result in a claim, your business would
be liable for the loss.
That's why it's critical to choose an insurance company now with the finan-
cial strength to pay claims not just today, but in 20 or 30 years.
CNA Insurance Companies, NEwswEm, Mar. 11, 1991, at 2.
142. See, e.g., Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571 (D.
Colo. 1989) (Colorado law); New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800
(D. Del. 1989) (Delaware law); Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443 (NJ. 1990) (New
Jersey law); Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D.
Wash. 1990) (Washington law).
143. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., 259 NJ. Super. 538,563-64 (NJ. 1992).
144. 765 F. Supp. 881 (N.D.W. Va. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 78 (1992).
145. Id. at 883.
146. Id.
147. Id
148. Id at 884.
149. Liberty Mutual, 765 F. Supp. at 884.
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applied. Continuous trigger theory was described as a case "where an
injury process is not a definite, discrete event, the date of the occur-
rence should be the continuous period from exposure to the manifesta-
tion of damages."15 0 The court went on to hold that the manifestation
of harm occurred when the EPA notified Triangle that it was a poten-
tially responsible party.15 1 Therefore, property damage occurred from
1978 until December 1984, potentially giving rise to coverage from all
three CGL policies involved."5 2
3. The Injury-in-Fact or Actual Injury Theory
Under the injury-in-fact or actual injury approach, coverage is
triggered when actual harm is found to have existed. "In other words,
when the injury actually occurs, each policy then in effect is triggered.
It is of no consequence whether the injury has been discovered or
not."1153
The court in Detrex Chemical Industries, Incorporated v. Em-
ployers Insurance of Wausau 54 applied this approach. The insured,
Detrex, received a notice from the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources that it violated Michigan law by allowing a chemical sol-
vent associated with its production process to pollute the environment
at its site.15 5 In determining whether coverage triggered, the court
adopted the injury-in-fact theory.' 5 6 In order for coverage to be trig-
gered, the court reasoned, "an injury-and not merely exposure-
must result during the policy period."'5 7 Therefore, Detrex was re-
quired to show an actual injury before coverage would issue.158
.4. The Manifestation or First Discovery Approach
Under a manifestation approach, coverage for property damage is
triggered when damage is discovered or manifests to the injured party
or third party plaintiff. 5 9 This approach can be likened to the chil-
150. Id. at 885 (quoting G-ottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443 (NJ. App. Div. 1990)).
,151. Liberty. Mutual, 765 F. Supp. at 885.
152. Id.
153. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 1992 WL 123144, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). See, e.g., Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 746 F. Supp. 1310
(N.D. Ohio 1990); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Trizec Properties v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985); Industrial
Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
154. 746 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
155. Id. at 1315.
156. Id. at 1324.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1325.
159. See, eg., Summit Assocs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1235 (NJ.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, No. A-4233-86T7 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 1988).
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dren's game of "Hot Potato." Although the potato may be held by
many hands before it comes to rest, the one holding the potato when
the music stops loses. Likewise, an organization may be insured by
several different insurance companies over a period of years when
contamination is taking place, but only the policy in effect at the time
the contamination is discovered is liable to cleanup the entire mess.
The manifestation approach was applied by the court in Peerless
Insurance Company v. Strother.1' In this case, the insured, Carolina
Transformer Company, was engaged in the business of repairing elec-
trical transformers from 1959 to 1984.161 As a result of these activi-
ties, Carolina Transformer was notified by the EPA that it had
contaminated the surrounding soil and the surface water with PCBs. 62
Carolina Transformer had CGL coverage during the years 1970
through 1978.163 The court, applying the manifestation/first discovery
approach, held that no occurrence was alleged to have occurred under
the policy because the contamination, which was discovered in 1985,
was not discovered during the policy period (i.e., 1970-78).'"
PART III: PoTimAL COVERAGE AND LMITATIONS OF COVERAGE
FOR E oriNmrrETAL CLAIMS CASES
A. Other Avenues of Insurance Coverage in Environmental
Claims Cases: Wrongful Entry, Trespass, and Nuisance
Most CGL policies contain a definition of personal injury which
includes wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy. 165 These provisions may give rise to insurer liabil-
ity in environmental claims cases. For example, in the City of Edger-
ton. v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin,166 chemicals seeping
through to groundwater constituted an invasion of another's interest in
the private use of land and constituted an actionable negligent tres-
pass, liability for which was covered under the policy.
Furthermore, environmental claims cases asserting a cause of ac-
tion for trespass or nuisance should be covered under policies with
160. 765 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (North Carolina law).
161. Id. at 867.
162. Id. at 868.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 870.
165. See, e.g., Tital Holdings Syndicate Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990)
(New Hampshire law).
166. 517 N.W.2d 463, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 493 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. 1994). Cf.,
American Universal Ins. Co. v. Whitewood Custom Tteaters Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1140 (D.S.D.
1989).
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personal injury provisions. The laws in many states provide that a
person can be liable for causing a thing to enter the land of another
either through an intentional or negligent act.167 Similarly, insurers
have a duty to defend and indemnify their insureds for claims alleging
nuisance or creation of a health hazard. However, the coverage is not
triggered by a physical invasion; there must be an allegation of inter-
ference with the claimant's use, enjoyment or occupancy of his
property 1 68
B. Sophisticated Insured Limitation
As mentioned before, ambiguities in insurance policies are con-
strued against the insurer. This contra proferentem ("against the one
proffering") maxim was developed primarily because insurance con-
tracts are usually contracts of adhesion and are not freely negotiated.
Recently, this rule has come under attack. Insurance industry pundits
are pushing for an exception to this rule, involving sophisticated insur-
ance purchasers.
A sophisticated insured is a purchaser who has satisfied the fol-
lowing three elements: (1) the insured is legally sophisticated or their
relative bargaining power is equal to that of the insurance provider, (2)
the insurance policy was actually negotiated, and (3) the policy was
jointly drafted.169
In recent years, some courts have found that the anti-insurer pref-
erence may not be a viable construction norm in the realm of big
money commercial. insurance.1 71 In Eagle Leasing Corporation v.
167. See, e.g., Dial v. City of O'Falon, 411 N.E.2d 217 (Il1. 1980).
168. See, e.g., Town of Goshen v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 424 A.2d 822 (N.H. 1980); Ranger
Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 940 (1985), aff'd on rehearing, 509 So. 2d 945
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 255 S.W. 1046 (Ky. 1923).
169. See, e.g., Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 435,682 P.2d 1100 (Cal. 1984), AU Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990), Eagle-Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540
F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1976).
170. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1983) (In cases involv-
ing bargained-for insurance contracts, negotiated by sophisticated parties, the underlying adhe-
sion contract rationale for the doctrine is inapposite.); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1980) (The principle that ambiguities should be
construed against the insured does not apply in a situation where large corporations, advised by
counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a negotiated policy.); Falmouth
Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1990) (Policy of interpreting ambiguities
against the insurer does not apply strongly where the transaction is between two parties of equal
sophistication and equal bargaining power.); AItJ Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990) (Anti-insurer ambiguity norm and the doctrine of reasonable expectations applied less
stringently when the insured was sophisticated.).
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Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 7' for example, the Fifth Circuit
elaborated on the place of contra proferentem in such a situation:
We do not feel compelled to apply, or, indeed, justified in applying
the general rule that an insurance policy is construed against the
insurer in the commercial insurance field when the insured is not an
innocent but a corporation of immense size, carrying insurance
with annual premiums in six figures, managed by sophisticated
businessmen, and represented by counsel on the same professional
level as the counsel for insurers. In substance the authorship of the
policy is attributable to both parties alike. Significantly, the policy
in question is not the usual printed form but is what is known as a
"manuscript" policy, containing some standard printed clauses but
confected especially for [the insured]. It is true, of course, as the
trial judge observed, "scriveners of insurance policies are acutely
aware of the meaning and effect of the language". We comment:
So too, are counsel for large companies carrying fleet insurance
with annual premiums in six figures. There is no purpose in fol-
lowing the legal platitude that has no realistic application to a con-
tract confected by a large corporation and a large insurance
company each advised by competent counsel and informed
experts.1
72
The court went on further to justify its abandonment of the anti-
insurer maxim in a footnote, stating, "An insurance [contract] is usu-
ally a 'contract of adhesion', where the insured has no bargaining
power. Only for this reason, is the policy construed against the in-
surer.' ' 173 Therefore, where the insurance contract is negotiated and
jointly drafted, and the insured has equal bargaining strength to the
insurer, contra proferentem should simply not apply.
C. CERCLA Reauthorization
CERCLA is up for reauthorization this year. While a significant
departure from CERCLA's current liability system is not predicted,
several changes may occur.174
During the reauthorization process, Congress will have to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the statute thus far. After 13 years of enact-
ment, a total of roughly 1300 sites are on the National Priorities List
(NPL).17 Only 51 of these sites have been cleaned up and removed
171. 540 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
172. Md. at 1261.
173. Id. at 1261, n. 4.
174. Joan Glickman, A Superfund Retrospective: Past, Present, and.... Ptmutc MANAGE-
,mEr, Feb. 1994, at 4.
175. IL at 5.
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from the list.'76 Clearly, something must be done to make the cleanup
process more efficient. The delay in cleaning up sites is attributable to
the morass of lawsuits prevalent in CERCLA actions.' 77
Part of the problem centers around CERCLA's retroactive, strict,
joint and several liability scheme.178 The current scheme holds a party
liable for the entire cost of clean up even it they were not directly or
minimally responsible for the contamination.' 79 Further, a party can
be liable even if they followed all applicable laws at the time they
disposed of their' waste.'8 0 Although the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) does have the ability to enter into de minimus settle-
ment or create mixed funding agreements (i.e., pay for cleanup costs
on behalf of unidentified or insolvent parties), they rarely use these
tools.' 8' As a result of the liability scheme, CERCLA has created a
huge amount of litigation, especially in the insurance industry where
coverage disputes abound. The RAND Institute estimates that insur-
ers spent $1.3 billion on Superfund during 1986 and 1989-$1 billion
of this went to defending their insureds or defending against their in-
sureds in coverage disputes.' 2
The American International Group (AIG) and several other insur-
ance companies have come up with a solution to Superfund liability
problems which they believe will decrease the number of suits
filed.' 3 Their solution involves the creation of a broad-based trust
fund which would be used to pay for cleanup of waste disposed of
before 1987.184 The fund, called the National Environmental Trust
Fund (NETF), is not without its skeptics. Critics claim it would only
limit litigation for insurance companies who have already limited their
liability for post-1986 policies through the absolute pollution
exclusion.18 5
D. Technology Improvemaents in Pollution Identification
Technology improvements in pollution identification can help
identify industrial polluters and apportion liability more accurately.
The traditional method of identifying pollutants to its source has been
176. Id.
177. Williams, supra note 10, at 36.
178. Glickman, supra note 174, at 4.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Williams, supra note 10, at 36.
183. Glickman, supra note 174, at 7.
184. l
185. Id. at 8.
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to match the pattern of chemical components found in a sample to that
of its suspected source.'86 This method is incapable of discerning
where the pollution came from if two or more companies are engaged
in the same sort of industry.'
However, a new technique utilizing gas chromatography and
mass spectrometry is allowing investigators to create a unique "chemi-
cal fingerprint" of the pollutant.' This technique can be especially
useful in cases that involve more than one pollutant, more than one
source of pollution, and when the pollutant entered the' environment
several years ago.' 89
CONCLUSION
Americans are demanding clean up of enyironmental contamina-
tion and realize ignoring the problem will only make it more difficult
and costly to eradicate. Courts are walking a delicate edge when inter-
preting insurance policies. The high cost of environmental cleanup
can destroy a business. The courts have to decide which one: the in-
sured's or the insurer's. 90
The CGL insurance policy was designed to give insureds broad
protection for business liabilities. Since its introduction many years
ago, the CGL policy has continuously evolved. Major steps in its de-
velopment include creation of accidental and occurrence policies and
the pollution exclusion. It is important for an insured to understand
what kind of policy they have when seeking coverage for an environ-
mental claim. Some policies have been interpreted by the courts more
liberally and could provide the needed protection.
It is also imperative for an insured to understand when coverage
"triggers." Policies in effect years or decades ago may provide cover-
age for an environmental liability discovered today.
The savvy insured may also find coverage for pollution claims
under their personal injury endorsement. However, a sophisticated in-
sured who helps draft their policy provision may find that they lose
the protection of the contra proferentem maxim.
186. Fingering Pollution, EcoNoMis-r, Nov. 27, 1993, at 91.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Cleanup estimates range from $200 billion to $500 billion. However, at the end of
1990, property and casualty insurers only had $160 billion in financial reserves. Terri Thomp-
son, Premium Priced Controversies, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 3,- 1992, at 46, 48.
Over the next 50 years it is estimated that insurers will pay more than $1 trillion in Superfund
claims (which is equivalent to 60 Hurricane Andrews). Chris Roush, The Hurricane Called
Superfund, BusniNss WEc, Aug. 2, 1993, at 74.
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New technology developments and CERCLA reauthorization can
change liability schemes in the future. As pollution identification
technology advances, pollution fingerprinting can help eliminate or re-
duce an insured's CERCLA liability. CERCLA reauthorization will
most likely be geared to make the cleanup process more efficient and
reduce the amount of CERCLA litigation.
Understanding what protection is included in an insurance policy
can help an insured assess the liabilities and make wise business deci-
sions in regards to real estate transfers, mergers and asset acquisitions.
Environmental insurance and regulation will play an increasingly sig-
nificant role in the development of new product technology and the
means chosen for waste disposal.
